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 Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-building is 
Dominating Auctions 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors has 
captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite 
significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the 
auction mechanism.  This paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of 
book-building and auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the 
issuer using book-building were advertising-related quid pro quo benefits.  Specifically, 
we find that book-built issues were more likely to be followed and positively 
recommended by the lead underwriters and were also more likely to receive “booster 
shots” post issuance if the shares had fallen.  Even non-underwriters’ analysts appear to 
promote book-built issues more, but only when their underwriters stood to gain from 
acquiring shares in future issues from the recommended firm’s lead underwriter.  Book-
built issues also appeared to garner more press in general (but only after they had chosen 
book-building, not before). Yet, we do not observe valuation or return differentials to 
suggest that these types of promotion have any value to the issuing firm.  We conclude 
that underwriters using the book-building procedure have convinced issuers of the 
questionable value of advertising and promotion of their shares. 
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1) Introduction 
To observe the underwriting scandals that have come to light in the U.S. since the 
market crash of 2000, one might think that the book-building mechanism used to price 
initial public offerings would be under attack.  The reality, however, both in the U.S. and 
globally, is surprisingly the opposite.  In France, for example, where the market was 
roughly equally split in the 1990s between auctioned and book-built IPOs, auctions are 
now virtually extinct.  In Japan, when book-building was made available to issuers, IPO 
auctions instantaneously disappeared (See Kutsuna and Smith (2004)).  Sherman (2003) 
reports that in virtually all countries where book-building has been introduced recently, 
pre-existing auction mechanisms have disappeared or lost significant market shares.  In 
the U.S., competitors to the book-building underwriters such as W.R. Hambrecht that 
have attempted to create Dutch auctions for selling shares have not, as yet, been 
successful in gaining meaningful market share. 
Convincing theoretical arguments for using auctions in IPOs exist as well as 
strong empirical support that auctions are less costly, not just in direct fees, but also in 
minimizing initial underpricing, which is a significant cost to the issuing company.  Biais, 
Bossaert and Rochet (2002) and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) show that well-
designed auction mechanisms allow underwriters to extract investors’ information and to 
incorporate this information into the IPO price at a limited cost, a virtue previously 
attributed to book-building by Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990), and Sherman (2000).  Derrien and Womack (2003) provide empirical support for 
auction theory in IPOs.  They find that auctioned IPOs indeed exhibit lower underpricing 
than book-building, especially during “hot” IPO markets. 
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Therefore, the central question we ask is: why do we observe the ostensible 
failure of auctions despite strong financial characteristics in their favor?  Our hypothesis 
is that corporate issuers and investment banks are in a quid pro quo relationship that 
extends beyond the obvious direct costs: issuers are willing to pay the higher direct and 
indirect costs of book-building in exchange for increased and more favorable research 
coverage when they choose book-building rather than an auction.  In a survey of issuers 
that switched underwriters between their IPO and their SEO, Krigman, Shaw and 
Womack (2001) find that the most important reason for switching was to enhance analyst 
coverage.  Cliff and Denis (2003) provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
issuers use IPO underpricing to “purchase” analyst coverage.  
In order to test the quid pro quo hypothesis, we examine the behavior of security 
analysts following IPOs by book-building vs. IPOs by auction.  While this comparison is 
impossible in the U.S., where book-building is the only procedure available, France 
offers an interesting investigation field: there, the two mechanisms coexisted for some 
time. 
We find convincing empirical evidence that in addition to placing the IPO shares 
with investors, underwriters employing book-building implicitly commit to providing 
more favorable coverage to the companies they take public in the aftermarket.  
Specifically, we find that analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of the offering issue 
more (and more favorable) recommendations for recent book-built IPOs than for 
auctioned offerings.  We also find that these analysts provide “booster shots”, that is, 
positive recommendations following poor stock market performance, to recent book-built 
IPOs. We do not observe this behavior in auctioned offerings. 
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An important feature of the book-building mechanism is the complete discretion 
of the underwriter over the allocation of shares to investors.  This feature of book-
building recently made financial headlines in the context of several IPO scandals.  
Unlawful underwriters’ practices include “spinning”, i.e. giving underpriced IPO shares 
to executives of prospective investment banking clients in the hope of winning future 
underwriting business from them, and “laddering”, the practice of giving generous IPO 
allocations to clients in return for the promise that they would buy more shares of the IPO 
company on the aftermarket.1 
The discretion underwriters enjoy in the allocation of book-built IPO shares gives 
them a substantial amount of power.  We hypothesize that lead underwriters use this 
power to “lean on” even unaffiliated analysts to provide positive coverage.  We find 
empirical confirmation of this hypothesis.  Specifically, we find that unaffiliated analysts 
issue positive recommendations on IPOs taken public by an underwriter if this 
underwriter is about to take another company public soon (using book-building).  We do 
not observe this behavior for auctioned IPO underwriters. 
We also examine press coverage of IPO companies, and find that, even though 
book-built IPOs are not more covered by the press before they go public (and before they 
choose their IPO procedure), they receive more press coverage after the IPO.  We 
interpret this result as evidence that book-building underwriters use their resources to 
influence the press to advertise their recent offerings. 
We find no evidence that companies choosing book-building benefit from the 
additional promotion they enjoy.  Book-built offerings do not exhibit better long-term 
                                                          
1 In April 2003, ten investment banks agreed to pay $1.4 billion in a global settlement regarding an analyst 
conflict of interest probe by the SEC, the NYS Attorney General, and the NASD.  Other recent examples 
can be found on Jay Ritter’s web site (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipolink.htm). 
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performance,  are priced at lower multiples, and have lower stock price performance in 
the year following good recommendations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present our 
hypotheses.  In Section 3, we briefly describe the institutional features of the French IPO 
market.  In Section 4, we describe the data used in the study.  Section 5 presents our 
empirical results, Section 6 discusses our findings, and Section 7 concludes. 
2) Hypotheses 
Globally, book-building has become the most popular procedure for taking 
companies public by far.  In fact, in many countries it is essentially the only method used.  
An alternative mechanism for selling a portion of the company to public investors is to 
conduct an auction.  While auctions come in many flavors, it is generally accepted that 
they have attractive properties, in terms of eliciting information from market participants, 
and maximizing proceeds for the issuer.  Moreover, Derrien and Womack (2003) report 
empirical evidence on the French IPO market, where both auctions and book-building 
were used to take companies public.  They find that auctioned IPOs “leave less money on 
the table” at the offering (have lower initial returns) than book-built IPOs, especially in 
“hot” IPO markets.  If auctions enable IPO issuers to raise more cash at lower cost, why 
do issuers often prefer book-building? 
Our central hypothesis is that the book-building procedure entails a tacit 
agreement between issuers and banks.  According to this “quid pro quo”, issuers are 
willing to pay the higher direct and indirect costs of book-building in exchange for 
increased, and more favorable, analyst coverage.  Thus, we hypothesize that in addition 
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to placing the IPO shares, book-building underwriters implicitly commit to provide 
favorable coverage to IPOs in the aftermarket. 
Coverage comes in several forms, research reports and analyst recommendations 
being among the most prominent.  Obtaining favorable coverage for their stock ranks 
among the top concerns of the managers of IPO firms.  For example, Krigman, Shaw and 
Womack (2001) document that the desire to increase reputable analyst coverage is a main 
reason for issuers to switch underwriters when they return to the equity market for an 
equity offering.  Dunbar (2000) finds that IPO underwriters increase their market share  if 
they have analysts in the Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team.  Rajan 
and Servaes (1997) find that the intensity of analyst coverage is positively correlated with 
the degree of initial return.  Cliff and Denis (2003) confirm this result, and find that post-
IPO analyst coverage is negatively correlated with the probability of switching 
underwriters between the IPO and the SEO.  They conclude that issuers “purchase” 
analyst coverage with underpricing.  One reason for this interest in analyst coverage is 
offered by Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002).  They develop a model in which 
issuers use underpricing to generate analyst coverage and maximize the stock price at the 
end of the lock-up period, that is, when they can sell their retained shares. 
Providing coverage, especially favorable coverage, for an IPO stock, is not 
without costs for an underwriter.  In addition to the cost of devoting human resources, 
there is potentially a reputational cost to be borne, if investors perceive that analyst 
recommendations are slanted.  Yet recent newspaper headlines have shown that 
investment bankers are sometimes willing to bear such costs.  Michaely and Womack 
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(1999) find evidence suggesting that analyst recommendations for IPO stocks are tainted 
by conflict of interest.  
We hypothesize that analysts affiliated with the IPO underwriter are more actively 
involved in supporting book-built IPOs than auctioned IPOs in the year following the 
offering.  Our hypothesis yields a number of testable predictions.  Relative to auctioned 
IPOs, affiliated analysts in book-built IPOs should provide (1) more analyst reports, (2) 
more recommendations, (3) more favorable recommendations, and (4) more 
recommendations when the stock price does poorly (known as “booster shots” – see 
Michaely and Womack (1999)). 
In addition to the lead underwriter’s direct contribution to coverage through 
research reports and recommendations, we hypothesize that the underwriters of book-
built IPOs also use their resources to influence the coverage of the IPO stocks by 
unaffiliated analysts and other third parties, such as the press.  Influencing the press may 
be achieved simply through a targeted public-relations effort.  The channels of influence 
using unaffiliated analysts are more subtle.  An important feature of the book-building 
mechanism is the complete discretion of the underwriter over the allocation of shares in 
case of excess demand.  This discretion gives the underwriter a substantial amount of 
power vis-à-vis investors and other brokerage firms.  We hypothesize that underwriters 
may use this power to induce these banks to provide positive coverage to their recent 
IPOs. 
Consider two investment banks, A and B. Bank A has taken company X public, 
and is going to take company Y public next month.  Bank B was not a co-manager for  
the IPO of X, nor does it expect to be one for the IPO of Y.  Yet Bank B hopes to obtain 
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generous share allocations of IPO Y next month.  One way to curry favor with Bank A is 
to issue favorable recommendations on the company X.  Thus, we expect the coverage of 
a book-built IPO by analysts unaffiliated with the underwriter to be especially favorable 
when that same underwriter is about to take another company public using the book-
building mechanism. 
If indeed book-built IPOs enjoy more promotion than auctioned IPOs, does this 
translate into tangible benefits for issuers? Such benefits might include higher valuation 
multiples, higher aftermarket liquidity, stronger long-term performance, or a better ability 
to raise additional funds from the equity market in the future.  
3) Institutional features of the French IPO market 
The French IPO market offers an ideal testing ground for the hypotheses 
developed in the previous section.  Historically, two IPO mechanisms were used there: 
Offre à Prix Minimal, an auction mechanism, and Offre à Prix Ferme, a fixed-price 
mechanism.  In 1993, the book-building procedure was made available to issuers by the 
stock market authorities.  For a few years, these three mechanisms co-existed.  In this 
paper, we consider auctioned and book-built IPOs between 1993 and 1998, a period over 
which the two mechanisms were roughly used with equal frequency. 
The book-building mechanism used in France is similar to its North-American 
counterpart.2  A few weeks before the offering, the issuer and the lead underwriter (or 
book-manager) agree on an initial price range.  Then the “road-show” starts, during 
which the underwriter and the issuer advertise the offering to potential investors.  The 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed description of the two listing mechanisms and institutional details of the French IPO 
market, see Derrien and Womack (2003). 
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underwriter collects indications of interest from investors.  These indications of interest 
specify a quantity of shares, and may or may not specify a price limit.  They can be 
cancelled or modified before the offering.  Right before the offering, the lead underwriter 
closes the order book, sets the IPO price and allocates the shares with complete discretion 
often to its largest or favourite customers. 
In auctioned IPOs, the price setting and share allocation process is done in the 
following way.  A few weeks before the shares start trading, the issuer and the 
underwriter agree on a minimum price.  Investors are then asked to submit orders.  These 
orders must contain a quantity and a limit price above the minimum price.  Unlike 
indications of interest submitted in book-built offerings, these orders cannot be 
withdrawn before the offering.  The orders are collected by the Paris Bourse.  A few days 
before the IPO date, the Paris Bourse sets a maximum price, above which orders are 
eliminated,3 and proposes several IPO prices to the issuer.  There is no written rule as to 
how these IPO prices are chosen, but discussions with issuers and Paris Bourse 
employees suggest that they are set slightly below the market clearing price.  The issuer 
and the underwriter choose the IPO price from the set of prices proposed by the Paris 
Bourse.  All orders with prices above the IPO price and below the maximum price are 
served at the IPO price, and rationing is done on a pro rata basis. 
Thus, whereas the role of the underwriter is crucial in book-built offerings, it is 
much more modest in auctioned IPOs.  Moreover, as is the case in most U.S. IPOs, book-
built offerings are associated with a firm commitment of the underwriter.  On the 
                                                          
3 The goal of this maximum price is to prevent investors from free-riding on the mechanism by placing 
orders at very high prices in order to get IPO shares that are underpriced on average. 
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contrary, auctions are associated with “best effort” contracts, i.e. the underwriter is not 
committed to buying the shares that are left unsold to the public. 
In our time period, French initial public offerings took place on three exchanges.  
The Premier Marché is the exchange on which the largest companies are traded.  Except 
for a few large firms, few IPOs take place on this exchange, and issuers generally choose 
to list on the Second Marché or on the Nouveau Marché.  Due to different listing 
requirements, the Second Marché attracts well-established mature companies, whereas 
the Nouveau Marché is designed for growth companies.  This exchange was created in 
1996 following the Nasdaq’s model. 
The French sell-side security analyst market is similar to its U.S. counterpart.  
However, contrary to the U.S. IPO market, there is no “quiet period” in France for IPO 
stocks.  Therefore, there is no clustering of initiation of analyst coverage a few weeks 
after the offering, as is the case in the United States.4  Analyst coverage can start as early 
as the IPO date, or even before the company’s shares are traded.  
4) The data 
Our IPO sample consists of book-built and auctioned IPOs completed on the 
French stock exchange.  Since our goal is to compare auction and book-building, we 
focus on a period in which these two mechanisms were both in use.  Thus, we restrict our 
IPO sample to the period between January 1993 and August 1998 when there were 204 
IPOs.  One-hundred fourteen of them were done by book-building and 90 were done by 
auction.  (Since September 1998 and until December 2003, 170 companies have been 
                                                          
4 See Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) on the initiation of analyst coverage at the end of the quiet period 
for U.S. IPOs. 
  10
listed on the Paris stock exchange, and only 12 have used the auction mechanism.)  Given 
the difference in size between Premier Marché IPOs and those completed on the two 
other exchanges and the fact that there were only 17 IPOs on the Premier Marché during 
our time period, we limit our sample to those completed on only the Second Marché and 
Nouveau Marché.  We also ignore companies transferred from the Marché Libre, a 
transitory exchange that is comparable to the OTC market in the U.S.  Indeed, 
informational issues may be less important for these companies, which were previously 
publicly traded before their IPO, than for “regular” offerings.  Thus, our sample contains 
204 initial public offerings. 
Our data about the characteristics of the IPO firms and the details of the offering 
comes directly from preliminary prospectuses.  This information consists of the financial 
statements of the company in the years preceding the offering, the IPO mechanism used, 
the number of shares offered, the initial price range (for book-built offerings) and 
minimum price (for auctions), and the names of lead underwriters and co-managers.  For 
12 auctioned IPOs, we were not able to identify the lead underwriters. In subsequent 
tests, whenever we examine hypotheses related to the behaviour of analysts affiliated to 
the lead underwriter, we eliminate these 12 offerings from our sample. 
IPO prices were obtained from Euronext, as were aftermarket prices in the year 
following the IPO.  The data on trading volume and bid-ask spreads in the year following 
the offering come from Datastream. 
For each IPO in our sample, we collected analyst recommendations from the 
I/B/E/S analyst-by-analyst, “detail” recommendation database.  We track analyst 
recommendations issued in the one year period following the IPO.  For each 
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recommendation, the date of the recommendation is available, as is the type of the 
recommendation (classified by I/B/E/S as 1: strong buy, 2: buy, 3: hold, 4: underperform, 
and 5: sell), and the name of the broker who issued the recommendation.  Overall, we 
identified 845 such recommendations for the 204 IPOs in our sample. 
We also collected information on the total number of reports written by analysts 
in the year following the offering and on the number of newspaper articles written about 
the IPO companies from six months before the offering to one year after the IPO.  The 
number of reports is obtained from the Investext research database of Thomson Research.  
For each IPO company, we know the number of reports that have been written in the year 
following the offering, as well as the name of the brokerage house that issued them.  The 
number of newspaper articles in which the names of the IPO companies appeared in 
headlines or lead paragraphs was collected using Factiva. 
Moreover, we hand-collected information on seasoned equity issues by our IPO 
companies in the five-year period following their initial offering from Euronext.  This 
information contains the date and amount of each SEO. 
5) Empirical results 
A. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our IPO sample. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
In Table 1, Panel A, we present the number of IPOs per year, exchange, and 
industry.  First, we notice that the proportion of book-built IPOs has increased over the 
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period.  Whereas between 1993 and 1997, the number of offerings using the two 
mechanisms was quite balanced, there were twice as many book-buildings as auctions 
between January and August 1998 (52 vs. 26).  As for exchanges, the use of the two 
mechanisms is well balanced on the Second Marché.  On the contrary, all Nouveau 
Marché IPOs have used the book-building mechanism, even though choice is permitted 
by the exchange authorities.  The important role of the underwriter as well as the firm 
commitment contract associated with book-building may be used as a certification 
mechanism by Nouveau Marché offerings, which are young, growth companies, and for 
which the listing requirements are not as strict as for Second Marché IPOs.5  Industries 
are quite balanced between the two mechanisms, with a few exceptions: information 
technology companies seem to prefer the book-building mechanism, which is probably 
due to the fact that a large fraction of these IPOs are listed on the Nouveau Marché. 
Table 1, Panel B presents the list of lead underwriters who managed our sample 
of IPOs.  Three of the lead underwriters are not matched in the I/B/E/S recommendation 
database.  These three intermediaries were lead underwriters of 9 offerings (6 auctions 
and 3 book-buildings).6  In other cases the underwriter is not included in I/B/E/S, but one 
of their subsidiaries or their mother company is.  In such cases, we consider the bank and 
its subsidiary as a single entity.  Panel B of the table also shows that large underwriters 
are as likely to do auctions as book-building.  In fact, the lead underwriter with the largest 
                                                          
5 The intrinsic differences between Nouveau Marché and Second Marché offerings might have biased our 
statistical tests.  We verified that when we eliminate Nouveau Marché offerings from our sample, our 
results are virtually unchanged. 
6 In subsequent tests, whenever we examine hypotheses related to the behavior of analysts affiliated to the 
lead underwriter, we eliminate these 9 IPOs. 
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number of IPOs completed in the period was Banques Populaires, which appeared to 
specialize in auctions (33 of the 37 IPOs underwritten by this bank were auctions).7 
In Table 1, Panel C, we present summary statistics on the IPO sample.  Book-built 
IPO companies are on average larger than auctions.  Their size also exhibits more 
variance (with an interquartile range of FF 431 million, vs. FF 161 million for auctions). 
On the Second Marché, large issuers tended to choose book-building.  On the Nouveau 
Marché, where issuers are typically small, all IPOs have used book-building.  Book-built 
offerings are also younger on average.  They also use more underwriters (lead and co-
managers) on average, and pay larger IPO fees (7.05% vs. 5.53% for auctioned IPOs).  
Note that the information on IPO fees was available for only a very small fraction of 
auctioned offerings (11 out of 90 such IPOs).  This may explain why our results differ 
from the level of underwriting fees for auctioned offerings suggested by practitioners, 
which is closer to 3% of gross proceeds.  Book-built issuers tend to do more SEOs in the 
five-year period following their IPO (0.51 per firm on average, compared to 0.28 for 
auctions). They also have larger initial underpricing, consistent with the findings of 
Derrien and Womack (2003). 
B. The IPO procedure chosen and levels of analyst coverage 
Table 2 presents statistics on the number of analyst reports and analyst 
recommendations issued in the year following the IPO for both mechanisms.  The 
number of analyst reports is obtained from the Investext research database of Thomson 
Research, whereas individual recommendations come from the I/B/E/S analyst-by-
                                                          
7 Since Banques Populaires accounts for about one third of the auctions in our sample, a legitimate concern 
is that our subsequent results might be driven by this specific bank. We checked that our results are robust 
when we remove the IPOs underwritten by this bank from our sample. 
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analyst database.  Both sources give the name of the broker that issued the report or the 
recommendation, which allows us to determine the affiliation of the analyst.8  An analyst 
can be coded as lead-affiliated, non lead-affiliated, or unaffiliated.  We consider that the 
analyst is lead-affiliated if he or she works for the lead underwriter of the offering, or one 
of its subsidiaries, or its mother company.  An analyst is non lead-affiliated if he or she 
works for a co-manager of the IPO (excluding the lead underwriter), one of its 
subsidiaries, or its mother company.  All the analysts that are not affiliated with the lead 
underwriter or co-underwriters are considered unaffiliated. 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
The first column of Table 2, Panel A presents the number of analysts that issued 
at least one recommendation in the year following the offering.  Lead-affiliated analysts 
do so much more frequently for book-buildings than for auctions: only 26% of auctions 
received at least one recommendation from their lead underwriter, as opposed to 62% of 
book-built IPOs.  Unaffiliated analysts also issue more recommendations for book-built 
offerings: 71% of book-built IPO firms received unaffiliated recommendations, as 
opposed to 53% of auctions, and 18% of book-buildings received recommendations from 
more than 4 unaffiliated analysts, versus only 9% for auctions. 
The second column of Table 2, Panel A breaks down our sample by the number of 
analyst research reports covering the IPO.  Most companies are not covered at all in the 
year following their IPO.  But book-built offerings attract the attention of more analysts 
than auctions: almost none of our auction sample IPOs had reports written by lead-
                                                          
8 Throughout the paper, we focus on the name of the brokers who issued reports or recommendations, not 
on the name of individual analysts, and we use the terms “broker” and “analyst” interchangeably. 
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affiliated analysts, while more than 20% of book-built IPOs did.  The same pattern holds, 
to a lesser extent, for non lead-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. 
The third column of Table 2, Panel A classifies offerings according to the number 
of recommendations received in the first year of their public life.  Again, book-built IPOs 
attract more recommendations from lead-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts than their 
auctioned counterparts. 
Table 2, Panel B confirms these results in a multivariate analysis.  We run Poisson 
regressions where the dependent variables are the number of analysts issuing 
recommendations in the year following the IPO (columns 1, 4 and 7), the number of 
analyst reports (columns 2, 5 and 8), and the number of recommendations received 
(columns 3, 6 and 9).  The book-building dummy is the explanatory variable of principal 
interest.  To avoid any left-over variable bias, we include other explanatory variables that 
are likely to influence analyst coverage, and may be correlated with the IPO procedure 
used.  Rajan and Servaes (1997), Cliff and Denis (2003), and Aggarwal, Krigman, and 
Womack (2003) find that initial underpricing is strongly associated with analyst 
coverage, so we include initial returns as an independent variable.  An IPO with more 
underwriters may benefit from greater coverage, hence we include the number of 
underwriters (lead and co-managers) as well.  We include the stock exchange, firm size, 
IPO year and industry as control variables.9 
The regressions in Table 2, Panel B strongly suggest that book-built offerings 
have greater analyst coverage – especially coverage from lead-affiliated analysts.  For 
example, book-built IPOs receive about twice as many recommendations (and 19 times 
as many reports) from lead-affiliated analysts as auctions (p-value < 5%). 
                                                          
9 To conserve space we do not report the coefficients on the industry or the IPO year dummy variables. 
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However, our results might be affected by the endogeneity of the IPO mechanism.  
To address this issue, we use a two-stage methodology which has been used previously in 
comparable situations (see for instance Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)).  The principle 
of the methodology is to estimate first the probability of choosing the book-building 
mechanism as a function of exogenous variables.  In the second stage, the book-building 
dummy variable is replaced by its estimated value using the results of the first stage.  
Table 1 gives a list of good candidates for our exogenous variables.  Book-built IPOs are 
larger, younger than auctions.  More secondary shares are sold in book-built IPOs.  
Moreover, Table 1 suggests that book-building was used more frequently at the end of 
our sample period.  Also, firms in some industries may be more prone to use this IPO 
mechanism.  We use these variables in a Probit regression in which the book-building 
dummy is the dependent variable.10  The results in Table 2, Panel C, show that these 
variables are good predictors of the probability of the book-building mechanism being 
used (Pseudo-R2 = 52%).  Next, we replicate our previous tests, replacing the book-
building dummy variable by its predicted value using the results of the first stage.  Most 
of our previous results are confirmed.  The coefficients on the estimated book-building 
variable are close to those we obtained in our previous tests, and statistical significance is 
similar. 
C. Are lead-affiliated analysts more bullish in book-built IPOs? 
                                                          
10 We exclude observations from the Nouveau Marché, on which the IPO mechanism is not a choice 
variable (all IPOs on this exchange have chosen the book-building mechanism so far). 
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Are analyst recommendations more positive for book-built IPOs than for 
auctions?  Our quid pro quo hypothesis predicts that affiliated analyst recommendations 
should be more positive in book-built deals. 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
In Table 3, Panel A, we consider all analyst recommendations issued within one 
year of the initial public offering for our sample of companies.11  Lead-affiliated analysts 
are more positive for book-built than for auctioned offerings: 82% of their 
recommendations on book-buildings are “strong buys” or “buys”, compared to 67% for 
auctions.  The same picture appears for non lead-affiliated analysts, whose 
recommendations are “strong buys” or “buys” 84% of the time for book-buildings (vs. 
68% for auctions).  Unaffiliated analysts exhibit no difference in bullishness across the 
two types of offerings. 
These results are confirmed by the multiple regressions of Table 3, Panel B.  We 
report ordered probit regressions in which each individual analyst recommendation is 
used as an observation.  In order to take into account the fact that recommendations for 
the same company can be correlated and that some companies receive more 
recommendations than others, we calculate z-statistics using Huber’s (1967) 
methodology.12  Both lead-affiliated and non lead-affiliated recommendations are 
significantly more positive for book-built than for auctioned offerings (i.e. the book-
building dummy variable exhibits a significantly negative sign at the 1% and at the 10% 
                                                          
11 Analysts mostly issue “strong buy” and “buy” recommendations for our sample of IPOs (71% of the 
recommendations are of one of these two types), consistent with previously documented findings for 
seasoned companies (Womack (1996)). 
12 In the rest of the paper, we use the same methodology whenever different firms have different numbers 
of observations. 
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level for lead-affiliated and non lead-affiliated recommendations respectively).  Holding 
other variables at their sample means, the likelihood of receiving a “strong buy” 
recommendation from a lead-affiliated analyst increases by 19% (from 25% to 44%) for 
book-built offerings, and the likelihood of receiving a positive (“strong buy” or “buy”) 
recommendation increases by 22% (from 57% to 79%).13  This result is consistent with 
our quid pro quo hypothesis.  Unaffiliated analysts, on the contrary, do not issue more 
favorable recommendations for either of the two types of offerings. 
In Table 3, Panel C, we consider the potential endogeneity of the choice of IPO 
mechanism.  We repeat the tests above, replacing the book-building dummy variable by 
its predicted value using the results of the first stage regression we obtained in Table 2, 
Panel C.  The results are very similar to those we obtain in previous tests, which confirms 
that endogeneity is not a major issue. 
D. Booster shots 
In Table 4, we explore analyst recommendations conditional on past stock price 
performance of IPO firms.  Under the quid pro quo hypothesis, we are more likely to 
observe positive recommendations after poor performance from affiliated analysts, a 
practice known as giving “booster shots”.  Table 4, Panel A presents the number of 
analyst recommendations and their average type depending on the past stock price 
performance of the IPO.  For each recommendation, past performance is calculated as the 
average daily buy-and-hold return since the offering adjusted using size and book-to-
market portfolios of seasoned companies.  Seasoned companies are split into 5 size 
portfolios and 5 book-to-market portfolios, and each IPO is assigned to one of the 25 
                                                          
13 See Greene (2003), p. 736, on the interpretation of ordered probit coefficients. 
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size/book-to-market portfolios depending on its size and book-to-market values as of the 
IPO date. 
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Consistent with the quid pro quo hypothesis, the results in the first two columns 
of Table 4, Panel A suggest that lead-affiliated analysts provide “booster shots” to book-
building IPO firms: the worse the past performance, the more favorable the 
recommendation (the average recommendation type is 1.64 for recommendations in the 
third of bad performance, 1.96 in the good-past performance third).  Moreover, almost 
half the recommendations for book-built IPOs coming from lead-affiliated analysts 
follow bad performance (Panel A, first column).  In other cells of the table, analyst 
recommendations are almost always less favorable after bad performance than after good 
performance.  In particular, analysts affiliated with lead underwriters of auctions do not 
seem more keen on providing recommendations after bad performance, and when they do 
so, they provide unfavorable recommendations (the average recommendation type is 2.23 
for recommendations in the bottom third of performance, vs. 1.93 in the top third). 
We examine in greater detail the “booster shot” phenomenon in Panels B and C of 
Table 4.  In Panel B, we run ordered probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the type of recommendation.  In addition to the usual set of control variables and a lead-
affiliated dummy variable equal to 1 when the analyst is lead-affiliated, we create two 
interaction variables: Lead-affiliated*negative past performance is equal to one when the 
analyst is lead-affiliated and the adjusted past performance since the offering is negative, 
0 otherwise.  (1-Lead-affiliated)*negative past performance is equal to one when the 
analyst is not lead-affiliated and the adjusted past performance since the offering is 
  20
negative, 0 otherwise.  We run this regression for book-built and auctioned IPOs 
separately. 
For book-built offerings, the coefficient on the Lead-affiliated*negative past 
performance variable is negative, whereas the coefficient on the (1-Lead-
affiliated)*negative past performance variable is significantly positive at the 1% level.  
Thus, after bad performance, lead-affiliated analysts issue more favorable 
recommendations while other analysts issue less favorable recommendations.  These two 
coefficients are significantly different at the 1% level.  This result confirms that “booster 
shots” are prevalent and significant for lead-affiliated analysts in book-built IPOs.  The 
picture is opposite for auctions: the signs are reversed – that is, following poor stock price 
performance, lead-affiliated analysts issue less favorable recommendations, while other 
analysts issue more favorable recommendations.  Lead-affiliated analysts administer 
“booster shots” in book-built IPOs, not in auctions. 
In another variant of the “booster shot” phenomenon, Table 4, Panel C, examines 
the total number of positive recommendations (“buy” or “strong buy”) given to an IPO by 
its lead-affiliated analysts in each month of the first post-IPO year.  Our objective is to 
track whether analysts decide to issue positive recommendations on the basis of recent 
stock price performance.  We run Poisson regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the number of positive recommendations for each firm/month pair.  In addition to the 
usual set of control variables, we include a variable named Performance change and the 
number of months since the IPO.  Performance change is equal to 1 in a month when the 
stock’s price performance had been positive since the IPO but turned negative in the prior 
  21
month.14  (This is exactly the situation in which a booster shot by the underwriter would 
be expected.) 
The results in Table 4, Panel C reinforce the impression conveyed by Panels A 
and B.  For book-built offerings, a recent negative change in stock price performance is 
associated with an increase in the monthly number of positive recommendations issued 
by lead-affiliated analysts: book-built IPOs receive about twice as many positive 
recommendations from lead-affiliated analysts when their performance changed from 
positive to negative recently (the coefficient of the Performance change variable is 
significantly positive at the 5% level). Such is not the case for auctioned offerings.15  
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 are consistent with the “booster shot” hypothesis 
that lead-affiliated analysts support book-built IPOs (but not auctioned IPOs) by issuing 
favorable recommendations after poor stock price performance.  
E. Do unaffiliated analysts try to curry favor with the underwriter? 
Our attention so far has focused mostly on affiliated analysts.  Next, we consider 
unaffiliated analysts, and examine their incentives to provide support to IPO stocks.  Our 
conjecture (suggested to us by conversations with practitioners) is that book-building 
underwriters, who choose the allocation of shares, may also influence the behavior of 
unaffiliated analysts.  In order for the lead underwriter to allocate generous amounts of 
shares to their clients, unaffiliated analysts may be induced to offer coverage that favors 
this underwriter.  One way of doing this is by issuing favorable recommendations on the 
                                                          
14 Past performance is calculated as the Cumulative Abnormal Return since the IPO, using comparable size 
and book-to-market portfolios as benchmarks. 
15 For auctioned offerings, we also find that the number of positive recommendations issued by lead-
affiliated analysts decreases with the number of months since the IPO.  We do not observe this 
phenomenon for book-built IPOs, which indicates that support by lead-affiliated analysts, in addition to 
being stronger for book-buildings than for auctions, also lasts longer. 
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recent IPOs made by the underwriter.  We might expect unaffiliated analysts to be 
especially prone to this ingratiating behavior when it is most valuable for the underwriter, 
that is, when the IPO has been doing poorly.  This hypothesis, which we label the 
“currying favor” hypothesis, is only relevant for book-built IPOs, since the allocation of 
auctioned IPO share is non-discriminatory. 
In Table 5, we test this hypothesis by counting the number of positive (“buy” or 
“strong buy”) recommendations issued by unaffiliated analysts in two distinct situations: 
- when the lead underwriter of the IPO is underwriting another IPO before the end of 
the next month,16 
- when the lead underwriter of the IPO is not underwriting another IPO before the end 
of the next month. 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Table 5, Panel A shows that book-built IPOs receive more positive 
recommendations from unaffiliated analysts in the months when their lead underwriter is 
about to underwrite another book-built offering (0.22 on average) than in the months 
when this is not the case (0.17 on average).  This phenomenon is most pronounced for 
firms in the bottom third of past performance: poor-performance IPOs receive three times 
as many unaffiliated positive recommendations per month on average when their lead 
underwriter is doing another book-building in the next month as when he is not (the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level). 
                                                          
16 We believe that one month is a natural window to consider. Indeed, allocation decisions for book-built 
IPO shares are presumably not made more than a month in advance. 
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We also find that when unaffiliated analysts’ incentives to curry favor with the 
lead underwriter are low – that is, when the lead underwriter is not about to do another 
IPO soon – unaffiliated analysts issue more positive recommendations when past IPO 
performance is stronger.  This association breaks down when unaffiliated analysts’ 
incentives to curry favor with the underwriter are high -- that is, when the lead 
underwriter is due to take another company public in the coming month. 
Unlike book-built offerings, auctioned IPOs do not exhibit this result.  The 
number of unaffiliated positive recommendations per month is quite similar 
independently of whether the underwriter is doing another IPO in the following month.   
These results are confirmed in the Poisson regressions presented in Table 5, Panel 
B.  In the first column of the table, we consider book-built IPO firms.  The New IPO in 
the next month variable, equal to 1 when the lead underwriter of the offering is 
underwriting an IPO the next month, is positively associated with the monthly number of 
unaffiliated positive recommendations received by an IPO firm (p-value: 6%).  The 
coefficient is larger and statistically significant at the 5% level when we consider 
firm/month pairs in the bottom third of past performance only (in the third column): 
book-built IPOs in the bottom third of past performance receive 53% more positive 
recommendations from unaffiliated analysts when their underwriter is about to 
underwrite another book-building in the next month.  Again, no such pattern appears for 
auctioned IPOs (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 5, Panel B). 
F. IPO procedure and press coverage 
If book-building underwriters want to support the aftermarket price of the IPO 
stocks they underwrite, they may also influence other information sources by providing 
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them with more (presumably favorable) information about the firm’s prospects.  In Table 
6, we consider the coverage of book-built vs. auctioned offerings in the press.  For each 
IPO in our sample, we count the number of newspaper articles in which the firm’s name 
appeared in the headline or lead paragraph in the year following its offering. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
In Panel A of the table, we classify IPO firms depending on the number of 
newspaper quotes received in the year following the offering.  Book-built offerings 
appear to be significantly more covered by the press than auctioned IPOs: only a quarter 
of book-built IPO firms receive ten newspaper quotes or less in the year following their 
IPO, compared to more than 50% of auctions, and about a quarter are cited in more than 
30 newspaper articles (vs. about 7% for auctions).  This is confirmed in the first column 
of Table 6, Panel B.  In a multivariate analysis controlling for size, industry and other 
IPO characteristics, we find that the number of articles covering a book-built IPO is 38% 
higher than for auctioned IPOs (p-value: 2%). 
Might book-built IPOs be intrinsically more visible or attractive to the press?  We 
examine this possibility by considering press coverage before the offering.  Typically, 
IPOs choose their underwriter and IPO procedure about three months before the offering. 
Before that date, any difference in press coverage is likely attributable to intrinsic 
visibility differences.  From that date onward, the underwriter’s incentives to advertise 
the IPO in the press are in place. 
We split the six-month period before the IPO into two three-month periods, 
assumed to correspond to before and after the firm chooses its IPO procedure.  Table 6, 
Panel A, suggests that book-built offerings receive more press coverage only after they 
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have chosen the book-building mechanism.  Before they choose their IPO procedure, 
auctioned IPOs receive about the same amount of press coverage as book-built IPOs 
(70% of book-built IPO firms are never cited in the press, as opposed to 62% of 
auctions). 
After issuers choose their IPO procedure (in the three months preceding the 
offering), the picture becomes consistent with the post-IPO press coverage: only 26% of 
book-built IPOs receive five newspaper quotes or less (compared to 64% of auctions), 
and 39% receive more than ten (compared to 8% for auctions).  This result is confirmed 
in Table 6, Panel B.  In the three-month period preceding the offering, book-built IPOs 
receive 50% more press coverage than auctions (p-value: 0.1%).  Thus, the extra press 
coverage enjoyed by book-built IPO firms appears to be the result of their IPO procedure, 
rather than other intrinsic company characteristics. 
G. Do investors disentangle analysts’ incentives? 
Next, we consider whether investors disentangle analysts’ incentives by looking 
at stock price reactions to positive (“strong buy” or “buy”) recommendations for all types 
of security analysts and the two types of IPO mechanisms.  If investors are suspicious of 
analysts’ incentives, they should discount positive recommendations by lead-affiliated 
analysts, especially when these recommendations are likely to be “booster shots” meant 
to prop up an IPO’s faltering price. 
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
Table 7, Panel A reports the stock price reaction to positive recommendations, 
measured by performance between recommendation date minus one day and 
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recommendation date plus one day adjusted using size and book-to-market portfolios.  
This reaction is significantly positive in two situations: when non lead-affiliated analysts 
issue positive recommendations about book-built IPO firms, and when unaffiliated 
analysts issue positive recommendations about auctioned IPO firms.  This is consistent 
with the “skeptical market” hypothesis of Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2004), that is, with 
investors’ rationality and our previous findings that these analysts seem to provide honest 
recommendations.  More surprising is the positive mean reaction to positive 
recommendations from lead-affiliated analysts for book-built IPOs. 
Next, we explore this point in greater detail.  Our previous results indicate that 
lead-affiliated analysts issue (presumably biased) positive recommendations in order to 
support the stock price of their IPO firms only when their performance has been 
disappointing.  In Table 7, Panel B, we examine reactions to lead-affiliated analyst 
positive recommendations for book-buildings, depending on the past performance of the 
IPO.  Consistent with the “skeptical market” view, we find a large difference between 
reactions to recommendations following bad performance and those that follow good 
performance: -0.65% vs. 5.79% on average, -0.62% vs. 1.95% for the median, 
respectively.  The average (median) price reactions for firms in the top and bottom thirds 
of  past performance are statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% (the 
10%) level.  This suggests that investors understand the incentives of lead-affiliated 
analysts, and react favorably to their positive recommendations only when they follow 
good past performance.  Auctioned offerings exhibit no such effect. 
Panels C and D of Table 7 examine the one-year stock price performance 
following positive recommendations.  One-year performance starting two days after the 
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recommendation is calculated as a buy-and-hold return adjusted using size and book-to-
market portfolios.  Median one-year performances following positive recommendations 
are statistically significantly negative for all types of analysts for book-built IPO 
companies (at the 5% level, the 10% level, and the 5% level for lead-affiliated, non lead-
affiliated, and unaffiliated analysts, respectively). 
In Table 7, Panel D, we present multiple regressions in which the dependent 
variable is one-year stock price performance following positive recommendations.  We 
find that the coefficient of the book-building dummy variable is significantly negative at 
the 5% level when we consider lead-affiliated recommendations: after a positive 
recommendation from a lead-affiliated analyst, book-built IPOs underperform auctions 
by 39% on average.  If negative average stock price performance following positive 
recommendations is associated with analyst’s bias at the time he or she issues the 
recommendation, this result is consistent with our previous findings on the behavior of 
lead-affiliated analysts. 
H. Do book-built IPOs benefit from the additional promotion they enjoy? 
  We have found that book-built IPOs enjoy a significant amount of additional 
promotion relative to auctioned IPOs. Does this translate into tangible benefits for the 
issuers? Possible benefits include higher valuation multiples, higher aftermarket liquidity, 
stronger long-term performance, and a greater ability to raise funds from the equity 
market in the future. We now examine whether issuing companies choosing book-
building enjoy these benefits. We report our findings in Table 8. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here.] 
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In a nutshell, we find no evidence of such benefits for book-built offerings. First, 
we regress the book-to-market value of our IPO firms calculated ten days after the 
offering17 against a set of control variables and a book-building dummy variable.  The 
coefficient on the book-building variable is equal to 9.2% and is significantly positive at 
the 5% level, indicating that, other things equal, book-built offerings have book-to-
market values about 10% above those of their auctioned counterparts at the IPO date.  
Thus, book-built offerings have relatively lower IPO valuations than auctions. 
Next, we compare the one-year stock performance of the two types of offerings. 
One-year performance starting ten days after the IPO is calculated as a buy-and-hold 
return adjusted using size and book-to-market portfolios.  Book-built IPOs slightly 
underperform auctions, but not significantly so. 
The three measures of liquidity we use in the next regressions are the average 
trading volume, the average turnover, and the average bid-ask spread (normalized by the 
mid-price) in the year following the IPO.  The regression in column 2 indicates that book-
building companies have higher trading volume than auctions, but in the two regressions 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of the table, they do not appear to have larger turnover or 
lower bid-ask spreads. 
Finally, we consider seasoned equity offerings done in the five-year period 
following the IPO, both in terms of number of SEOs done during this period and total 
amount raised.  In Panel C of Table 1, we observed that book-built offerings did more 
SEOs in the next five years than auctions on average.  However, this result does not hold 
up in the multivariate analysis of Table 8, columns 5 and 6. 
                                                          
17 We consider market capitalization using the price at the end of the 10th trading day instead of the IPO 
price because a higher degree of underpricing (i.e. a lower IPO price) may be chosen by book-building 
issuers in order to elicit information production. 
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In Table 8, Panel B, we replicate these tests using two-stage least squares. Our 
conclusions are unchanged: book-built IPOs are not priced at higher multiples, do not 
exhibit higher stock performance, liquidity or probability of returning to the market in the 
years following their IPOs. 
6) Discussion 
Our central argument is that issuers are willing to pay the higher costs of book-
building in exchange for increased and more favorable analyst coverage when they 
choose book-building rather than an auction.  Why, then, does book-building dominate 
auctions – and why did book-building crowd out auctions in France after 1998?  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that a shift occurred in the late 1990s, especially during 
the Internet bubble, whereby issuing firms placed increasing weight on analyst coverage.  
They call this the “analyst lust” hypothesis, and they argue that it can explain in part the 
surge in IPO underpricing during that period.  We conjecture that a similar shift occurred 
outside the U.S., and that it contributed to the demise of IPO auctions in France.  Faced 
with a choice between auctions (low cost, low coverage) and book-building (high cost, 
high coverage), firms increasing chose the latter as the perceived importance of analyst 
coverage grew.18  
In addition to explaining the preference for book-building, our evidence also 
sheds light on the issue of the conflicts of interests faced by underwriter-linked analysts 
in IPOs.  Michaely and Womack (1999) provide evidence consistent with a conflict of 
interest.  On a sample of U.S. IPOs, they find that underwriter analyst recommendations 
                                                          
18 One of the forces underlying Loughran and Ritter’s “analyst lust” hypothesis is the increase in company 
valuations in the late 1990s.  When companies’ growth opportunities fetch higher prices, a small change in 
expected growth rates results in a larger change in selling price, leading companies to place greater weight 
on analyst coverage. 
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are more bullish than recommendations from unaffiliated analysts.  However their 
evidence is also consistent with Kahneman and Lovallo’s (1993) “inside view.”  
According to this view, affiliated analysts view the IPO their bank took public in a 
narrow frame.  Like parents who view their children as special, they are unable to accept 
the statistical reality that many of their IPOs will turn out to be average or below average, 
and therefore, they are more likely to issue bullish recommendations than unaffiliated 
analysts, who are more willing to take a cold-hearted “outside view.”  If underwriter 
analyst bullishness were only due to the “inside view” explanation, we would expect no 
difference in coverage or bullishness between auctioned IPOs and book-built IPOs.  
Hence our evidence provides additional support for the conflict of interest explanation of 
underwriter analyst bullishness. 
Some of our evidence may be loosely related to theories of information 
production in IPOs. For example, Chemmanur and Liu (2002) develop a model in which 
the goal of issuers is to maximize the long-term value of their stock. In this model, 
company insiders are informed and outsiders are uninformed but can acquire information 
at a cost.  The gains from acquiring information are competed away in auctions, whereas 
a non-auction mechanism (such as book-building) allows underwriters to reward 
informed investors with underpriced shares.  Therefore, book-building may generate 
more information production than auctions.  A natural prediction of this model is that in 
equilibrium, firms of higher “quality” (i.e., of higher intrinsic value) choose book-
building over auctions, in order to maximize information production and consequently 
long-term value. The predictions of their model are in part similar to those of our “quid 
pro quo” story: both frameworks predict lower visibility for auctions, in the form of press 
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coverage or analyst recommendations.  Unlike our “quid pro quo” argument, the 
Chemmanur and Liu (2002) argument does not predict that coverage will be less slanted 
for auctioned IPOs, only that it will be less abundant. 
7) Conclusion 
 Two facts appear indisputable.  First, book-building as a selling procedure for 
initial public offerings has captured most of the market share in most important global 
equity financing markets in the last 5 years.  Second, and not inconsequentially, is the 
fact that book-building is by far the most costly procedure available in terms of direct 
fees and indirect initial underpricing.  Together, these points beg an important question of 
what benefits issuers must believe they are receiving for paying extra. The answer is not 
obvious at first blush.   
 Our evidence supports the claim that in France where book-building and auctions 
were equally popular for much of the 1990s, underwriters and issuers had a non-
contractual quid pro quo arrangement where book-building underwriters promoted the 
issuing company through more positive research and press coverage.  Not only were the 
lead underwriters involved, but unaffiliated analysts as well.  We document that analysts 
at unaffiliated investment banks also were more likely to promote a book-built issue if 
they stood to gain shares in future deals from the book-building underwriter.    
We find no evidence that the extra compensation paid to book-building 
underwriters pays future dividends.  Book-built IPOs are no more likely to have longer-
term higher returns relative to auctioned shares following positive recommendations.  In 
other words, investors in the long run appear able to disentangle analysts’ and their 
banks’ incentives in book-built IPOs.  Thus, even though book-building, with its higher 
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direct costs, is more lucrative to investment banks, we find no evidence that this 
mechanism helps issuers.  Maybe book-building is a better mechanism than auctions in 
some aspects not considered in this paper, but if so, its tangible advantages have yet to be 
articulated and empirically documented. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 204 offerings (114 book-buildings and 90 auctions) completed between January 1993 and 
August 1998 on the Second Marché and Nouveau Marché of the Paris stock exchange. 
Panel A presents the number of IPOs per year, exchange and industry for the two mechanisms. 
Panel B presents the lead underwriters’ names, and for each of them, the number of auctions and book-buildings in 
which he was lead underwriter. Recs not recorded in I/B/E/S in the column to the right of the table indicates that the 
recommendations made by the underwriter’s brokerage house are not recorded in the I/B/E/S database. 
Panel C presents summary statistics of the sample IPOs per listing mechanism. Market capitalization is the total number 
of shares post-issue times the IPO price, in millions of French Francs. Secondary shares is the number of pre-IPO 
shares sold in the offering divided by the total number of shares outstanding after the IPO. Age is the age of the 
company as at IPO date. Book-to-market is the ratio of book to market value of equity as at IPO date. Number of 
underwriters is the total number of deal managers involved in the IPO. Underwriting fees is the ratio of fees paid to the 
underwriters to gross proceeds. Number of SEOs is the number of equity offerings in the five years following the IPO. 
Initial return is the percent difference between the IPO price and the closing price at the end of the 10th trading day. 
IQR is the interquartile range. 
 
Panel A: Number of observations per IPO year, exchange and industry 
  Book-building Auction Total 
IPO year 1993 1 1 2 
 1994 11 11 22 
 1995 1 8 9 
 1996 19 23 42 
 1997 30 21 51 
 1998 52 26 78 
Exchange Second Marché 53 90 143 
 Nouveau Marché 61 0 61 
Industry Mechanical engineering 4 3 7 
 Intermediate goods 3 5 8 
 Other capital goods 3 3 6 
 Automotive 2 7 9 
 Household/Professional goods 8 8 16 
 Pharmaceuticals/Cosmetics 7 7 14 
 Opticals 1 1 2 
 Textile 5 2 7 
 Beverages 5 2 7 
 Other agrifood 6 2 8 
 Electricity/Electronics/Telecommunication 11 6 17 
 Information technology 19 10 29 
 Communication/Advertising/Broadcasting 6 7 13 
 Consumer retailing 11 9 20 
 Sport/Entertainment 4 2 6 
 Transport/Storage 3 2 5 
 Environment/Collective services 8 5 13 
 Sales to business 1 4 5 
 Hotels/Catering/Tourism 4 4 8 
 Insurance 3 1 4 
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Panel B: Lead underwriters 
Underwriter’s name Book-building Auction  
ABN Amro 2 0  
Aurel 3 0  
BA Robertson Stephens International 1 0  
Banque Française de Service et de Crédit 0 2  
BNP 7 7  
Banques Populaires 4 33  
Banque CPR 5 0  
Banque Colbert 1 0  
Banque Scalbert-Dupont 1 0  
Banque Worms 2 2 Recs not recorded in I/B/E/S 
Banque d’Orsay 0 4 Recs not recorded in I/B/E/S 
Banque de Neuflize, Schlumberger, Mallet 1 0  
Banque de Vizille 2 0  
Crédit Agricole 10 10  
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 3 0  
Crédit Industriel et Commercial 5 7  
Crédit Lyonnais 15 3  
Crédit National 6 5  
Crédit Mutuel 0 2  
Cyril Finance 1 0 Recs not recorded in I/B/E/S 
Ferri 4 0  
HSBC 1 0  
Hambrecht & Quist 3 0  
Lazard 2 0  
Lehman Brothers 1 0  
Lyonnaise de banque 0 1  
Merril Lynch 1 0  
Natexis 1 0  
Natwest 1 0  
Nomura 1 0  
Oddo 2 0  
Paribas 8 1  
Pinatton 9 0  
Société Générale 9 1  
SPEF Technology 2 0  
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Panel C: IPO characteristics 
  Book-building Auction 
Market capitalization (in MFRF) 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
567 
263 
431 
55 
6,138 
114 
287 
187 
161 
62 
1,356 
90 
Secondary shares 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
12.00% 
10.14% 
15.80% 
0 
56.09% 
114 
10.89% 
10.00% 
4.38% 
0 
27.64% 
90 
Age 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
17.65 
10.00 
14.00 
1.00 
124.00 
98 
18.24 
15.00 
16.00 
1.00 
61.00 
86 
Book-to-market 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
0.26 
0.17 
0.25 
-0.01 
1.16 
111 
0.26 
0.22 
0.17 
0.03 
0.76 
90 
Number of underwriters 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
2.08 
2.00 
1.00 
1.00 
9.00 
114 
1.79 
2.00 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
90 
Underwriting fees 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
7.05% 
6.76% 
4.84% 
1.29% 
17.14% 
78 
5.53% 
4.80% 
7.26% 
1.56% 
12.90% 
11 
Number of SEOs 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
0.51 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
4.00 
114 
0.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.00 
90 
Initial return 
Mean 
Median 
IQR 
Min 
Max 
N 
20.57% 
8.94% 
32.26% 
-24.97% 
155.00% 
114 
15.93% 
7.69% 
26.46% 
-38.21% 
128.57% 
90 
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Table 3 
Type of analyst recommendations by analyst affiliation 
Panel A presents the number of analyst recommendations within one year of the IPO by type of recommendation for 
book-buildings vs. auctions. Recommendations can be of 5 types: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 correspond to “strong buy”, “buy”, 
“hold”, “underperform”, and “sell”, respectively. The number of recommendations of each type is reported for both 
IPO mechanisms by type of analyst affiliation. An analyst is considered lead-affiliated if he works for the lead 
underwriter of the IPO, or one of its subsidiaries, or its mother company. An analyst is considered non lead-affiliated 
if he works for one of the underwriters of the IPO (but not the lead underwriter), or one of its subsidiaries, or its 
mother company. All other analysts are considered unaffiliated. The number in parenthesis is the percentage of  
recommendations in the corresponding category. 
Ordered Probit regressions appear in Panel B. Types of recommendations from lead-affiliated, non lead-affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts are the dependent variables in columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For each recommendation, the 
type of recommendation is regressed against: Exchange, a variable equal to 1 for Second Marché IPOs, 0 for Nouveau 
Marché IPOs; Log(market capitalization); Initial return, the percent difference between the IPO price and the closing 
price at the end of the 10th trading day; Number of underwriters; and a book-building dummy variable. 
Panel C presents two-stage regressions. In the first stage, book-building is regressed on Log(market capitalization), 
age, secondary shares, and IPO year dummy variables in a Probit regression using Second Marché offerings only. Age 
is the age of the company at the time of the IPO (in number of years). Secondary shares is the number of pre-IPO 
shares sold in the offering divided by the total number of shares outstanding after the IPO. In the second stage, we 
replicate Panel B tests, replacing book-building by its estimated value using first-stage estimates. 
z-statistics, calculated assuming independence across companies using Huber’s robust variance estimator, are in 
parenthesis. 
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% level).  
 
 
Panel A: Type of analyst recommendations by IPO mechanism and type of analyst affiliation 
Analyst affiliation Type of recommendation # for book-buildings # for auctions 
Lead-affiliated 
1 (strong buy) 
2 (buy) 
3 (hold) 
4 (underperform) 
5 (sell) 
53 (48.2%) 
37 (33.6%) 
17 (15.4%) 
2 (1.8%) 
1 (0.9%) 
11 (33.3%) 
11 (33.3%) 
8 (24.2%) 
3 (9.1%) 
0 
Non lead-affiliated 
1 (strong buy) 
2 (buy) 
3 (hold) 
4 (underperform) 
5 (sell) 
30 (39.5%) 
34 (44.7%) 
10 (13.2%) 
2 (2.6%) 
0 
24 (33.8%) 
24 (33.8%) 
19 (26.8%) 
3 (4.2%) 
1 (1.4%) 
Unaffiliated 
1 (strong buy) 
2 (buy) 
3 (hold) 
4 (underperform) 
5 (sell) 
121 (32.5%) 
137 (36.8%) 
76 (20.4%) 
30 (8.1%) 
8 (2.1%) 
57 (31.1%) 
76 (41.5%) 
33 (18.0%) 
14 (7.6%) 
3 (1.6%) 
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Panel B: Determinants of analysts recommendations by type of analyst affiliation 
 Dependent variable: Recommendation type by 
Explanatory variables Lead-affiliated Non lead-affiliated Unaffiliated 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Initial return 
 
Number of underwriters 
 
Book-building 
 
Pseudo-R2 
Number of observations 
-0.582** 
(-2.18) 
0.195* 
(1.78) 
0.349 
(0.94) 
-0.027 
(-0.37) 
-0.812*** 
(-3.00) 
0.035 
143 
0.260 
(1.07) 
0.136 
(1.13) 
-0.204 
(-0.91) 
-0.039 
(-0.86) 
-0.303* 
(-1.67) 
0.018 
147 
-0.075 
(-0.44) 
-0.010 
(-0.21) 
-0.036 
(-0.27) 
-0.041 
(-1.03) 
0.015 
(0.14) 
0.002 
555 
 
 
Panel C: Determinants of analysts recommendations by type of analyst affiliation (second stage of two-stage 
regressions) 
 Dependent variable: Recommendation type by 
Explanatory variables Lead-affiliated Non lead-affiliated Unaffiliated 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Initial return 
 
Number of underwriters 
 
Estimated book-building 
 
Pseudo-R2 
Number of observations 
0.511*** 
(3.05) 
-0.539 
(-0.97) 
0.051 
(0.60) 
-1.702*** 
(-3.80) 
0.077 
86 
0.163 
(1.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.02) 
-0.056 
(-1.34) 
-0.328 
(-1.36) 
0.006 
125 
-0.006 
(-0.10) 
-0.105 
(-0.83) 
-0.025 
(-0.51) 
-0.038 
(-0.24) 
0.001 
451 
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Table 4 
Analyst recommendations and past stock price performance 
Panel A presents the number and average type of analyst recommendations within one year of the IPO by type of analyst 
affiliation for book-buildings vs. auctions, depending on past performance. Recommendations can be of 5 types: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 
5 correspond to “strong buy”, “buy”, “hold”, “underperform”, and “sell”, respectively. An analyst is considered lead-affiliated 
if he works for the lead underwriter of the IPO, or one of its subsidiaries, or its mother company. An analyst is considered non 
lead-affiliated if he works for one of the underwriters of the IPO (but not the lead underwriter), or one of its subsidiaries, or its 
mother company. All other analysts are considered unaffiliated. Past performance is the average daily buy-and-hold return 
adjusted using size/book-to-market portfolios between the IPO date and the recommendation date minus two days. This 
variable is divided into thirds, and each analyst recommendation is assigned to one third. The number in parentheses is the 
percentage of  recommendations in the corresponding category. 
Ordered Probit regressions appear in Panel B. For each analyst recommendation, the type of recommendation is the dependent 
variable. Book-built IPOs are in column 1, auctions in column 2. The independent variables are: Exchange, a variable equal to 1 
for Second Marché IPOs, 0 for Nouveau Marché IPOs; Log(market capitalization); Lead-affiliated, a variable equal to one if 
the analyst is lead-affiliated, 0 otherwise; and two interaction variables obtained by multiplying Lead-affiliated and 1-Lead-
affiliated by 1 if past performance is negative, 0 otherwise. 
Panel C presents Poisson regressions. The dependent variable is the number of positive recommendations (type 1, “strong buy”, 
or 2, “buy”) from lead-affiliated analysts for a given firm/month. The explanatory variables are Exchange; Log(market 
capitalization); Months since IPO, the number of months between the IPO date and the beginning of the month considered; 
Performance change, equal to 1 in a month when the stock’s cumulative adjusted price performance had been positive since the 
IPO but turned negative in the prior month. 
z-statistics, calculated assuming independence across companies using Huber’s robust variance estimator, are in parenthesis. 
Coefficients with an “a” (and, respectively, with a “b”, a “c”) in superscript are significantly different from each other at the 1% 
level (and, respectively, at the 5% level, at the 10% level). 
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% level).  
 
Panel A: Analyst recommendations by IPO mechanism and type of analyst affiliation depending on past 
performance 
  Book-building Auction 
Analyst affiliation Third of past performance 
Number of 
recommendations
Average type of 
recommendations
Number of 
recommendations 
Average type of 
recommendations 
Lead-affiliated 
1 (bottom) 
2 (middle) 
3 (top) 
50 (47.2%) 
32 (30.2%) 
24 (22.6%) 
1.64 
1.75 
1.96 
13 (39.4%) 
6 (18.2%) 
14 (42.4%) 
2.23 
2.17 
1.93 
Non lead-affiliated 
1 (bottom) 
2 (middle) 
3 (top) 
28 (38.4%) 
19 (26.0%) 
26 (35.6%) 
1.96 
1.74 
1.69 
26 (37.7%) 
17 (24.6%) 
26 (37.7%) 
1.88 
2.18 
2.23 
Unaffiliated 
1 (bottom) 
2 (middle) 
3 (top) 
123 (34.4%) 
132 (37.0%) 
102 (28.6%) 
2.33 
1.99 
2.02 
31 (17.7%) 
65 (37.1%) 
79 (45.1%) 
2.19 
2.17 
2.00 
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Panel B: Determinants of analysts recommendations – Ordered probit coefficients 
 Dependent variable: Type of recommendation 
Explanatory variables Book-building Auction 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Lead-affiliated 
 
Lead-affiliated * negative past performance 
 
(1-Lead-affiliated) * negative past performance 
 
Pseudo-R2 
Number of observations 
-0.153 
(-0.94) 
0.054 
(0.94) 
-0.165 
(-1.09) 
-0.279a 
(-1.26) 
0.459***a 
(3.45) 
0.019 
558 
-- 
 
0.057 
(0.62) 
-0.181 
(-0.66) 
0.689**c 
(2.00) 
-0.068c 
(-0.33) 
0.004 
287 
 
Panel C: Determinants of the monthly number of positive (“buy” or “strong buy”) recommendations from 
lead-affiliated analysts – Poisson regression coefficients 
 Dependent variable: Number of positive recommendations 
from lead-affiliated analysts for this firm/month 
Explanatory variables Book-building Auction 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Months since IPO 
 
Performance change 
 
Constant 
Number of observations 
0.353 
(1.15) 
-0.045 
(-0.36) 
-0.048 
(-1.19) 
0.708** 
(2.15) 
-2.053 
1,221 
-- 
 
-0.036 
(-0.09) 
-0.238*** 
(-2.77) 
0.031 
(0.03) 
-1.794 
792 
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Table 5 
Tests of the “currying favor” hypothesis 
Panel A presents the average number of positive recommendations (type 1, “strong buy”, or 2, “buy”) from unaffiliated analysts 
for a given firm/month, depending on past performance of the company and whether the underwriter of the IPO is underwriting 
another IPO between the beginning of this month and the end of next month. An analyst is considered unaffiliated if he does not 
work for any of the IPO underwriters. Past performance is the average monthly buy-and-hold return adjusted using size/book-
to-market portfolios between the IPO date and the beginning of the month considered. This variable is divided into thirds, and 
each firm/month pair is assigned to one of the thirds. In the first line of Panel A, we consider only book-built IPOs, and break 
down the sample of firm/month pairs depending on whether the lead underwriter of the IPO is underwriting another book-built 
IPO in the next month. In the second line of Panel A, we consider auctioned IPOs, and separate the sample of firm/month pairs 
depending on whether the lead underwriter of the IPO is underwriting another IPO (auctioned or book-built) in the next month. 
An “a” (and, respectively, a “b”) in superscript indicates significant difference between column-2 and column-4 numbers at the 
1% level (and, respectively, at the 5% level) in tests of equality of means with unequal variance. 
Panel B presents Poisson regressions, in which the dependent variable is the number of positive recommendations for a given 
firm/month pair from unaffiliated analysts for all firm/month pairs (columns 1 and 2) and for firm/month pairs in the bottom 
third of past performance (columns 3 and 4). The explanatory variables are Exchange; Log(market capitalization); Months 
since IPO, the number of months between the IPO date and the beginning of the month considered; Past performance; and New 
IPO in the next month, equal to 1 if the lead underwriter of the IPO is underwriting another IPO in the next month, 0 otherwise. 
z-statistics, calculated assuming independence across companies using Huber’s robust variance estimator, are in parentheses.  
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% level).  
 
Panel A: Number of unaffiliated analyst positive recommendations per month depending on past performance 
and whether the underwriter is underwriting another IPO in the next month 
  Is the lead underwriter doing 
another IPO in the next month? 
  No IPO in the next month IPO in the next month 
IPO mechanism Third of past performance 
Number of 
firm/month pairs
Average number of 
positive 
recommendations 
Number of 
firm/month pairs 
Average number of 
positive 
recommendations 
Book-building 
All 
1 (bottom) 
2 (middle) 
3 (top) 
1,153 
467 
365 
321 
0.17 
0.10b 
0.17 
0.28 
215 
54 
70 
91 
0.22 
0.30b 
0.17 
0.22 
Auction 
All 
1 (bottom) 
2 (middle) 
3 (top) 
740 
272 
226 
242 
0.13 
0.03 
0.08 
0.27 
339 
99 
125 
115 
0.11 
0.02 
0.13 
0.17 
 
Panel B: Determinants of the monthly number of positive recommendations from unaffiliated analysts 
Dependent variable: Number of positive 
recommendations this month All firm/month pairs 
Firm/month pairs in the bottom 
third of past performance 
Explanatory variables Book-building Auction Book-building Auction 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Months since IPO 
 
Past performance 
 
New IPO in the next month 
 
Constant 
Number of observations 
0.123 
(0.73) 
0.822*** 
(13.66) 
0.007 
(0.34) 
0.454*** 
(9.95) 
0.303* 
(1.86) 
-12.865 
1,368 
-- 
 
1.437*** 
(11.69) 
-0.094** 
(-2.08) 
0.858*** 
(8.81) 
-0.110 
(-0.48) 
-20.138 
1,079 
0.152 
(0.54) 
0.840*** 
(8.13) 
-0.005 
(-0.14) 
0.915*** 
(2.80) 
0.427** 
(2.25) 
-13.075 
521 
-- 
 
1.898*** 
(2.65) 
-0.037 
(-0.35) 
0.375 
(0.31) 
-0.107 
(-0.14) 
-26.933 
371 
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Table 6 
Press coverage for book-built vs. auctioned IPOs 
Panel A presents the count of IPOs depending on the number of newspaper articles written about the company 
within one year of the IPO, between IPO date minus 3 months and IPO date, and between IPO date minus 6 
months and IPO date minus 3 months (the percentage out of the total number of each IPO type is in 
parenthesis). 
Panel B presents Poisson regressions. The dependent variables are the number of newspaper articles written 
within one year of the IPO (column 1), between IPO date minus 3 months and IPO date (column 2), and 
between IPO date minus 6 months and IPO date minus 3 months (column 3). The explanatory variables are: 
Exchange, a variable equal to 1 for Second Marché IPOs, 0 for Nouveau Marché IPOs; Log(market 
capitalization); Initial return, the percent difference between the IPO price and the closing price at the end of 
the 10th trading day; and a book-building dummy variable. IPO year and industry dummy variables are also used 
as control variables, but their coefficients are not reported. z-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% 
level).  
 
Panel A: Number of newspaper articles by IPO mechanism 
 Number of IPOs receiving n newspaper articles 
Period n Book-building Auction 
IPO date to IPO date + 1 year 
0 to 5 
6 to 10 
11 to 20 
21 to 30 
>30 
13 (11.4%) 
17 (14.9%) 
35 (30.7%) 
20 (17.5%) 
29 (25.4%) 
26 (28.9%) 
23 (25.6%) 
18 (20.0%) 
17 (18.9%) 
6 (6.7%) 
IPO date – 3 months to IPO date 
0 to 5 
6 to 10 
11 to 20 
>20 
30 (26.3%) 
39 (34.2%) 
35 (30.7%) 
10 (8.8%) 
58 (64.4%) 
25 (27.8%) 
7 (7.8%) 
0 
IPO date – 6 months to IPO date – 3 months 
0 
1 to 3 
>3 
80 (70.2%) 
23 (20.2%) 
11 (9.6%) 
56 (62.2%) 
27 (30.0%) 
7 (7.8%) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of number of newspaper articles 
 Dependent variable: Number of newspaper articles 
Explanatory variables IPO date to IPO date + 1 year 
IPO date - 3 months 
to IPO date 
IPO date - 6 months to 
IPO date - 3 months 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Initial return 
 
Book-building 
 
Constant 
Pseudo-R2 
-0.091 
(-0.55) 
0.487*** 
(6.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.04) 
0.324** 
(2.38) 
-4.250 
0.412 
-0.209 
(-1.32) 
0.332*** 
(4.20) 
-- 
 
0.409*** 
(3.15) 
-3.049 
0.274 
-0.170 
(-0.37) 
0.763*** 
(4.19) 
-- 
 
-0.373 
(-0.81) 
-9.099 
0.302 
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Table 7 
Stock price reaction and one-year stock price performance following positive analyst recommendations 
Panel A presents the mean and median immediate stock price reactions to positive recommendations (type 1, “strong 
buy”, or 2, “buy”) for the three types of analyst affiliation. Stock price reaction is the buy-and-hold return adjusted 
using size/book-to-market portfolios between recommendation date minus 1 day and recommendation date plus 1 
day. An analyst is considered lead-affiliated if he works for the lead underwriter of the IPO, or one of its 
subsidiaries, or its mother company. An analyst is considered non lead-affiliated if he works for one of the 
underwriters of the IPO (but not the lead underwriter), or one of its subsidiaries, or its mother company. All other 
analysts are considered unaffiliated. 
Panel B presents the mean and median of immediate stock price reaction to positive recommendations by lead-
affiliated analysts only, depending on past stock price performance. Past performance is the average daily buy-and-
hold return adjusted using size/book-to-market portfolios between IPO date and recommendation date minus 2 days. 
This variable is divided into thirds, and each recommendation is assigned to one third. An “a” (and, respectively, a 
“b”, a “c”) in superscript indicates significant difference between numbers at the 1% level (and, respectively, at the 
5% level, at the 10% level) in tests of equality of means with unequal variance. 
Panel C presents the mean and median of 12-month stock price performance following positive recommendations, 
by type of analyst affiliation. Stock price performance is the buy-and-hold return adjusted using size/book-to-market 
portfolios between recommendation date plus 2 days and recommendation date plus 2 days plus twelve months. 
Panel D presents OLS regressions of 12-month stock price performance following recommendations against the 
following variables, for the three types of analyst affiliation: Exchange, a variable equal to 1 for Second Marché 
IPOs, 0 for Nouveau Marché IPOs; Log(market capitalization); Past performance; and a book-building dummy 
variable. IPO year and industry dummy variables are used as control variables, but their coefficients are not 
reported. z-statistics, calculated assuming independence across companies using Huber’s robust variance estimator, 
are in parenthesis. 
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% 
level).  
 
 
Panel A: Stock price reaction to positive recommendations by analyst affiliation 
Analyst affiliation  Book-building Auction 
Lead-affiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
1.12% 
0.07% 
88 
1.10% 
1.20% 
22 
Non lead-affiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
1.57%* 
1.12%* 
61 
-0.67% 
-0.51% 
46 
Unaffiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
0.28% 
-0.37% 
245 
0.88%** 
0.44% 
130 
 
Panel B: Stock price reaction to positive recommendations depending on past performance (lead-
affiliated analysts only) 
Third of past 
performance 
 Book-building Auction 
1 (bottom) 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
-0.65%b 
-0.62%c 
43 
-1.13% 
1.18% 
7 
2 (middle) 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
1.18% 
0.26% 
26 
4.30% 
4.35% 
4 
3 (top) 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
5.79%*b 
1.95%c 
17 
1.34% 
-0.43% 
11 
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Panel C: 12-month stock price performance following positive recommendations by analyst affiliation 
Analyst affiliation  Book-building Auction 
Lead-affiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
-5.02% 
-13.67%** 
89 
2.22% 
-21.91% 
22 
Non lead-affiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
-6.27% 
-19.85%* 
63 
-5.81% 
-22.67% 
48 
Unaffiliated 
Mean 
Median 
# of recommendations 
2.61% 
-9.20%** 
253 
-0.31% 
-0.26% 
129 
 
Panel D: Determinants of 12-month performance following positive recommendations by type of analyst 
affiliation 
 Dependent variable: 12-month stock price performance 
Explanatory variables Lead-affiliated Non lead-affiliated Unaffiliated 
Exchange 
 
Log(market capitalization) 
 
Past performance 
 
Book-building 
 
R2 
Number of observations 
-0.517* 
(-1.73) 
0.215* 
(1.84) 
6.752 
(0.28) 
-0.392** 
(-2.16) 
0.322 
107 
0.036 
(0.14) 
-0.080 
(-0.83) 
-4.242 
(-0.65) 
0.0033 
(0.19) 
0.392 
107 
-0.420 
(-1.45) 
0.070 
(0.93) 
6.641 
(1.15) 
-0.345* 
(-1.88) 
0.228 
365 
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Table 8 
Offer price, liquidity, and probability of doing SEOs for book-built vs. auctioned IPOs 
Panel A present regressions (OLS in all columns except column 5, where the dependent variable is Number of SEOs and 
Poisson regression is used). The dependent variables are book-to-market, where market capitalization is calculated at the 
end of the 10th trading day; One-year performance, calculated from the 10th trading day after the IPO as as a buy-and-hold 
return adjusted using size and book-to-market portfolios; Log(volume), equal to the natural logarithm of average daily 
trading volume in the year following the IPO; Log(Turnover), the natural logarithm of average daily trading volume 
divided by the float at IPO date; Log(spread), the average bid-ask spread (in percent of the mid-price) in the year following 
the IPO; Number of SEOs, the number of Seasoned Equity Offerings in the five-year period following the IPO; and 
Log(amount raised), the natural logarithm of the total amount raised in equity in the five-year period following the IPO, for 
firms with at least one SEO in this period. The independent variables are: Exchange, a variable equal to 1 for Second 
Marché IPOs, 0 for Nouveau Marché IPOs; Log(market capitalization); Initial return, the percent difference between the 
IPO price and the closing price at the end of the 10th trading day; and a book-building dummy variable. IPO year and 
industry dummy variables are used as control variables, but their coefficients are not reported. 
Panel B presents two-stage regressions. The first stage is similar to the first stage of the 2SLS regression in Table 2, Panel 
C. In the second stage, we replicate Panel A tests, replacing book-building by its estimated value using first-stage 
estimates. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* (and respectively **, ***) indicates significance at the 10% level (and respectively at the 5% level, at the 1% level). 
 
Panel A: OLS analysis 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables Book-to-market 
One-year 
performance Log(volume) Log(turnover) Log(spread) 
Number of 
SEOs 
Log(amount 
raised) 
Exchange 
 
Log(market 
capitalization) 
Initial return 
 
Book-building 
 
Constant 
R2 
Number of observations 
0.164*** 
(4.24) 
0.008 
(0.59) 
-- 
 
0.092** 
(2.41) 
-0.179 
0.168 
201 
-0.117 
(-0.82) 
-0.015 
(-0.25) 
0.317* 
(1.69) 
-0.066 
(-0.52) 
0.278 
0.273 
204 
-0.215 
(-1.01) 
0.952*** 
(10.10) 
1.219*** 
(5.61) 
0.346* 
(1.88) 
-8.062 
0.749 
141 
-0.082 
(-0.44) 
0.080 
(0.87) 
1.364*** 
(5.28) 
-0.266 
(-1.62) 
-0.477 
0.470 
135 
0.119 
(1.10) 
-0.264*** 
(-6.26) 
-0.513*** 
(-4.73) 
0.122 
(1.33) 
-1.095 
0.577 
141 
-1.042** 
(-2.00) 
-0.038 
(-0.24) 
0.510* 
(1.79) 
-0.262 
(-0.49) 
-14.529 
0.193 
204 
0.772 
(1.04) 
0.890*** 
(2.80) 
-0.359 
(-0.80) 
1.166 
(1.47) 
4.379 
0.622 
59 
 
Panel B: two-stage least squares (second-stage regression) 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables Book-to-market 
One-year 
performance Log(volume) Log(turnover) Log(spread) 
Number of 
SEOs 
Log(amount 
raised) 
Log(market 
capitalization) 
Initial return 
 
Estimated book-building 
 
Constant 
R2 
Number of observations 
0.019 
(0.50) 
-- 
 
0.087 
(0.73) 
-0.090 
0.404 
143 
0.071 
(0.88) 
0.364* 
(1.79) 
-0.159 
(-0.68) 
-0.542 
0.283 
143 
1.124*** 
(5.52) 
1.279*** 
(5.50) 
0.089 
(0.15) 
-10.619 
0.692 
98 
0.352* 
(1.87) 
1.443*** 
(7.21) 
-0.944* 
(-1.83) 
-4.192 
0.634 
94 
-0.239*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.510*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.008 
(-0.03) 
-0.090 
0.298 
98 
-0.229 
(-0.66) 
1.209 
(1.59) 
0.923 
(0.81) 
-15.693 
0.211 
143 
1.065 
(1.24) 
0.247 
(0.23) 
-0.320 
(-0.11) 
4.696 
0.9155 
27 
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